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The main objective of this paper is to provide a simple framework to
analyze exchange market policies in the presence of staggered nominal
contracts (see Phelps 1978; Taylor 1979, 1980). Although this is essen-
tially a theoretical essay and is, therefore, hopefully applicable to a
variety of circumstances, I will put special emphasis on the policies and
problems associated with the recent experience of the semi-industrialized
countries of the "Southern Cone" (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay),
where a centerpiece of the inflation stabilization packages was having a
preannounced (not necessarily constant) exchange rate against the
dollar.
The assumption of short-run sticky prices and wages has been amply
explored in the balance of payments literature (see Dornbusch 1980).
However, because the latter has typically been studied under the further
constraint that expectations follow some kind of "adaptive" scheme,
little is known about the effects of announcements that involve the future
change of a policy variable. An important exception is the work of Wilson
(1979); however, this effort is, in principle, not fully satisfactory because
the price adjustment equation involves only contemporaneous variables
(like "present" excess demand). Thus, an advantage of the Phelps-Taylor
staggered contracts approach is that present "new" contracts (an
obviously important ingredient for a change of the average price level)
are based on (rational) forecasts about the future course of all relevant
variables.
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But, of course, the recognition that a theory has an obvious limitation
is not enough justification for generalizing it, unless one feels that the
theory leads to implications that are bluntly invalidated by the facts, or
are potentially so significant for policy purposes that a search for robust-
ness is warranted.
Our motivation for extending the Dornbusch-Wilson assumption to
account for staggered (or overlapping) contracts is partly related to the
latter consideration. Recently, Krugman and Taylor (1978) have revived
the Hirschman (1949) and Diaz Alejandro (1963) view that a devaluation
could be contractionary in the short run. Thus, for instance, Diaz Alejan-
dro argues that a devaluation will result in a change in income distribution
in favor of profitmakers (the "high" savers) and against workers (the
"low" savers), leading to a contraction of aggregate demand, and hence
(with sticky prices) output. Since these models are of the income-
expenditure variety with no explicit consideration of wealth effects, the
above implication can more generally be stated by saying that a short-run
appreciation (depreciation) of the real exchange rate will be expansion-
ary (contractionary).
A bit more formally, let P denote the (log of) the nominal price of
domestically produced goods, and E the (log of) the exchange rate (i.e.,
the price of foreign in terms of domestic currency). Hence, the above
models imply that (given the price of importables, which we henceforth
assume constant and equal to one) aggregate demand is an increasing
function of:
(1) p^P-E.
In other words, iff(p) denotes the excess aggregate demand function, the
implication is that:'
(2) f'(p)>0.
The literature on this matter stops here, but imagine that we wish to




that is, we assume that the growth rate of the price of importables with
respect to domestic goods is an increasing function of aggregate demand.
Clearly, then, by (2) and (3), the system is unstable.
To couch the above finding in more familiar terms, let us (as usual) say
that the (log of the) real exchange rate (—p) appreciates if p increases.
1. /' > 0 is not an inevitable implication of those models (see Krugman and Taylor 1978),
but, for the time being, we will concentrate on it because it is the most interesting one.
2. A dot over a variable indicates that it is a time derivative.237 Staggered Contracts
Consequently, the model implies that if the currency is initially "over-
valued" (i.e., p>p, where f(p) = 0), the real exchange rate will keep
appreciating over time. A sudden devaluation may restore equilibrium if
it sets/7 = p, but if p overshoots in the opposite direction (p <p) a cycle of
increasing unemployment and real depreciation will follow. (Observers
of a country like Argentina in the 1979-81 period could not but be
impressed by the predictive power of this [apparently] simple model!)
3 It
is obvious, however, that these findings deserve a closer look.
In section 7.2 we discuss a continuous time, perfect capital mobility
version of the staggered contracts approach with rational expectations,
where, for the sake of generality, aggregate demand is also made a
function of the "real" interest rate. In section 7.3 we study the existence
and uniqueness of stable equilibria for a predetermined path of the
exchange rate. An important result in this respect will be to show that
when f'(p)>0 (at steady state) there exists a multiplicity (in fact, a
"continuum") of equilibria—thus contradicting the implications of the
Dornbusch-Wilson-type model. On the other hand, when/'(p)<0 a
unique, stable equilibrium exists, and in section 7.3 we proceed to char-
acterize it under the following conditions: (i) a constant rate of devalua-
tion, and (ii) a future expected discontinuous jump in (a) the level and (b)
the rate of growth of the exchange rate. The common outcome is that
(starting at steady state) there is a transitory appreciation of the real
exchange rate.
Section 7.4 studies the possibility of restoring uniqueness when
/'(/?) > 0 by adopting a crawling peg rule by which the rate of devaluation
is made a function of past rates of inflation ("minidevaluations"), and the
answer is found to be in the negative. However, the same question is
explored for the case where a government is able to impose controls on
capital mobility; it is shown that uniqueness is now a definite possibility if
the ratio of the derivative of aggregate demand with respect to the real
rate of interest to the interest semielasticity of the demand for money is
sufficiently large (in absolute value).
Section 7.5 analyzes the model with a perfectly flexible exchange rate
and perfect capital mobility. Conditions for uniqueness are found to be
the same as before, thus showing that the difficulties associated with
/'(/?) >0 cannot be cured by allowing the exchange rate to float. Fur-
thermore, when a unique stable equilibrium exists, results similar to
those in Dornbusch (1976) are shown to hold. The paper concludes in
section 7.6 with a discussion of the central results.
3. See Calvo (1981) for a sketch of the 1976-80 period, which was characterized by a
remarkable increase inp (over 100 percent) and full employment. In the period of January
to June 1981 a devaluation of more than 200 percent occurred, but it was associated with an
increase in the rate of unemployment of over three times (from about 2 percent to more than
6 percent according to educated guesses).238 Guillermo A. Calvo
7.2 A Model of Staggered Contracts
In this section we will assume the more general case where aggregate
demand is also a function of the real rate of interest. More specifically,
( Aggregate Excess Demand = f( , K
 } for Domestic Goods JKP>r},
where r is the real rate and,
(5) fP*O,f,<O.
Phelps (1978) and Taylor (1980) assume a contract technology by
which contracts are determined in nominal terms and are supposed to last
for an exogenous amount of time. In the present version, we basically
adopt the same assumptions except, to simplify the mathematics, we
suppose that contract length is stochastic and identically and indepen-
dently distributed across contracts; furthermore, if a contract has not yet
expired or is being renewed at time t, the probability (density) that it will
last for s more periods is:
(6) 8e"
8s, 8>0,
and is, therefore, independent of t and of the amount of time the contract
has lasted at t.
We envision a situation where there is a very large number of identical
firms (in fact, a "continuum"), each one setting the price of its own supply
of domestic goods. Thus, letting Vt denote the (log of) price set on
contracts renewed (or signed) at time t, we get
(7) Pt=h J Vse-
b{t'
s)ds.
Following Phelps (1978) and Taylor (1980), we assume that price
setters are rational (equivalent to "perfect foresight" in the present
context) and set their prices taking into account the average price level
and excess demand during the length of the contract. Given our previous
assumptions, it appears natural to make
4
5
(8) Vr = 8/[PJ + p/(pJ,rJ)]e-
8^-
r)£fa,p>0.
Therefore, at every point in time t where pt and r, are continuous, we
can differentiate (7) and (8) with respect to time to get
4. The following assumption is essentially the one in Phelps (1978) and Taylor (1980) for
"new" contracts.
5. With a nonzero real interest rate, (8) could also naturally incorporate a factor to
reflect it. This addition would, however, make steady states (in the ensuing analyses)
sensitive to permanent changes in the rate of devaluation or expansion of money supply.
Without denying the existence, and maybe importance, of such effects, we will stick to form
(8) for the sake of simplicity. See Phelps (1978) and Taylor (1979, 1980) for a similar
procedure.239 Staggered Contracts
(9) Pt = b(Vt-Pt),
(10) Vt
This constitutes our basic system. The following sections will close the
model by making different alternative assumptions on the exchange rate
regime and the degree of capital mobility.
7.3 Prefixed Rates and Perfect Capital Mobility
In this section we will assume that the (log of) the exchange rate, E, is
announced at time zero for the whole future; thus at any point in time we
have a regime of fixed exchange rates, but the latter may not be constant
over time (this is, in stylized form, the type of policy recently followed in
Southern Cone countries). Furthermore, we assume that the country is
small in the world financial markets and that there exists perfect capital
mobility. Thus, letting i denote the domestic nominal interest rate, and
assuming (to simplify notation) that the international interest rate is
equal to zero, we have:
(11) it = Et
at every t at which the (right-hand) derivative is defined.
We define:
(12) rt = it-P+
where P
+ is the right-hand derivative of P at t (i.e., the expected rate of
inflation of the domestic price level at t with perfect foresight).
Consider now the case where the exchange rate is constant over time
and equal to E. By (9), (10), (11), and (12) the system becomes:
(13) >,
(14) Vt = h{Vt-Pt-pf[Pt-E,b(Pt-Vt)]}.
At time t = 0, the "present," Po, is given by the outstanding contracts
and, thus, becomes a "predetermined" variable; Vo, however, is free to
take any value.
6 Consequently, the system is as yet unable to provide us
with a unique solution. To try to close the model, we will further impose
the condition that the solution converges to a steady state.
7 Figure 7.1
illustrates the determination of equilibrium for the case:
6. After t = 0, and as long as the policy announced at / = 0 remains unchanged, (8)
implies that V, will be continuous. Thus along an equilibrium path starting at t = 0, Vt can
jump with respect to its past values only at t-Q. Incidentally, notice that by the last
observation and (14), in the present case P exists (and hence equals/
3"
1") for a\\t>0 ( = the
"present").
7. This is an already standard procedure in rational expectations models. For a (partial)
justification, see Brock (1974) and Calvo (1979), and for earlier applications to the present




Fig. 7.1 Determination of equilibrium.
-E, 0)>0
(hereafter a bar over a variable indicates its steady-state value). It is
interesting to note that under the assumptions underlying figure 7.1,
equilibrium V is a function of P; thus if we denote it V*(P), we get, by
(13), that in equilibrium
and, thus, the model boils down to a fixed-rate version of Dornbusch
(1976).
From figure 7.1 and considerations given above, it should be clear at
this point that existence and uniqueness of equilibrium require that (13)
and (14) be characterized by saddle-path stability. Assuming away the
borderline case where the determinant of the linear approximation of
(13)—(14) vanishes at steady state,
8 a necessary and sufficient condition




8. For technical reasons, the borderline case will be assumed away in what follows.
9. For the linear system, a necessary and sufficient condition for saddle-path stability is
that the characteristic roots of A { have opposite signs. But since Det AY = \, \2, where \x X2 are the roots of Au it is easily seen that (16) is equivalent to the above condition.241 Staggered Contracts
where
(M\ A = jdP/dP,dP/dV\ = I -8
{
 }
 l \dV/dP,dV/dV) \-b[l + $fp(P-E,0)
8
+ p8/r(P - E, 0)], 8 [1 + 08/r(P - £,
Hence,
(18) det^pS^CP-I.O),
and condition (16) is satisfied if and only if
(19) £(/*-£, 0)<0.
Consequently, existence of a unique converging equilibrium path is
linked to the condition that, at steady state, a devaluation (i.e., increase
in E) be expansionary, not contractionary as in the Hirschman-Diaz
Alejandro-Krugman-Taylor case. If, contrariwise, we have:
(20) fp(P-E,0)>0
(i.e., if a devaluation is contractionary), then the system is locally stable
because, by (5) and (17),
(21) tM1 = p8
2/r(P-£,0)<0,
meaning that for Po sufficiently close to P there exists an infinite number
(in fact, a "continuum") of Vo values from which the system converges to
the steady state.
This "embarrassment of riches" simply entails that the model is not
powerful enough to convey information about the future course of the
economy (see Calvo 1978 for a discussion of this type of difficulty with
rational expectations models, and section 7.6 of this paper). Thus we are
led to the conclusion that, although contrary to the Dornbusch-type
model (1976), the present model exhibits stability when (20) holds, and
the economy will, instead, be immersed in complete confusion if indi-
viduals try to base their expectations on predictions derived from the
model.
Another point that is worth noting is that the condition for uniqueness,
(19), is independent from the interest elasticity of aggregate demand
101
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and, most remarkably, from the average contract length.
Consider now the case where there is a unique solution. First, we
notice that at steady state the real exchange rate (—p) is independent of
10. Notice that when this elasticity is sufficiently high (in absolute terms) a model similar
to the one discussed in section 7.1 would become stable.
11. To gain further insight into the uniqueness question, the reader is invited to study the
case where P is perfectly flexible and/(p, r) = 0 at all times. Interestingly enough, when
there is perfect capital mobility, the uniqueness condition is also exactly given by (19).242 Guillermo A. Calvo
E. Imagine now an unanticipated once-and-for-all devaluation at t = 0,
that is, A£>0 starting from steady state;
1
2 in terms of figure 7.1 this
implies that we start from a point like a. After the devaluation, the V — 0
curve shifts up, thus the new equilibrium (with same initial P) will move
to a point like b; P will start increasing until the initial p is restored. In
other words, an unanticipated devaluation will originally depreciate the
real exchange rate, but the latter will steadily recover its initial level.
1
3
Suppose now the perhaps more intriguing situation where at t — 0
people find out that a once-and-for-all devaluation will occur at tQ>0.
Thus, say,
£, = £0for0</<f0,
Et = E{ for t>t0,
where E{>E0. Figure 7.2 exhibits the dynamics of this case; the phase
diagram corresponds to E = Eo, except for the dashed curve which is the
saddle path associated with E = Ex. For equilibrium, V has to be con-
tinuous after t = 0 (the moment of the announcement), and the system
must be on some point of the dashed saddle path at t = t(). Thus it is clearly
seen that if the system was originally at a, it must jump to a point like b
and proceed along the dotted line until it exactly connects with c at t = t0.
Therefore, P starts rising before the devaluation occurs, meaning that:
(23) P[>p, 0</<?0,
that is, the real exchange rate appreciates during the transition before
devaluation actually occurs. Furthermore, since P keeps rising at c and,
as argued before, p at a equals p at d, then,
(24) pt<p,t0<t,
that is, despite its being anticipated, a devaluation results in a deprecia-
tion of the real exchange rate below p.
Intuitively this is easy to understand; because contracts made today
have to take into account the devaluation at t = f(), it is natural to expect
that before the devaluation actually occurs V, will be higher than it would
be otherwise, thus giving P an upward push. Furthermore, at the time of
the devaluation (t = f0), there will be some outstanding contracts that
took into account the exchange rate prevailing before t = t0, and thus the
corresponding Vs would be smaller than if the old exchange rate had
been equal to the new one; this explains the depreciation of the real
exchange rate at t = t0.
12. For the sake of concreteness all the comparative dynamics exercises of this paper will
assume that the system was originally at steady state.
13. Although we are basing our conclusions on figure 7.2, the reader can easily show that
this is a general feature. Incidentally, in order not to encumber the exposition with technical
details, propositions derived from specific examples will be meant to have general validity,




Fig. 7.2 Anticipated future devaluation.
Recalling (12), notice that the real interest rate, r, is always well
defined because P
+t exists for all £>0, and notice that under the present
assumptions,
(25) r,= -p+f>0.
Hence, both here and in the previous example, the real rate is negative
for all t and converges to zero (its steady-state value).
It is instructive to compare our model with the one discussed in section
7.1. Although, recalling figure 7.2, V is still functionally linked to P in
equilibrium, the function itself depends on the nature and timing of the
anticipations. In fact, even the functional relationship would cease to
hold in slightly more complicated examples. Thus, for instance, if we
assume:
E, = £0for 0<
Et = Ex for f()<
Et = E{) for t>tx,
and t! > t(h the equilibrium path will look like the arrowed curve in figure
7.3; clearly there we find values of P for which there are two Vs. Point b is
reached at t = 0, c at t0, d at tx, and a as r^oc.
1
4
14. The pattern shown in figure 7.3 corresponds to the case depicted in figure 7.1 and is
not generalizable.244 Guillermo A. Calvo
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Fig. 7.3 Transitory devaluation.
We now turn to the case where Et is continuous and Et is constant, or is
expected to have a one-step future jump (akin to the Southern Cone
experiences). Let us denote,
(26) v,= V,-Et.
Thus, subtracting E, from both sides of (9) and (10), and recalling (11)
and (12), we get:
(27) pt = b(vt-p,)-Et,
(28) v, = 8[v, - p, - p/(p,, - A)] - E,.
We will, first, consider a situation where,
(29) £, = e, forO<r.
The following results are easily shown: (a) steady-statep,p, is indepen-
dent of e (the rate of devaluation), and (b) the uniqueness condition is
(19), the same as before. Assuming uniqueness, consider now the case
where e is expected to take a once-and-for-all jump at t = tQ>0. This is
illustrated in figure 7.4 under the same assumptions as in figure 7.1. The
phase diagram corresponds to the situation before the jump in e, and the
dashed curve is the new saddle path after the jump. Thus, the system first
jumps from a to b and then smoothly travels from b to c; it reaches c at
t = t0, and then abruptly starts moving toward d (in a smooth fashion). In245 Staggered Contracts
p = 0
Fig 7.4 Effect of Ae at r = fo>0.
other words, suppose the system was at a rest point under the expectation
that e would be constant forever, and then it is announced that e will have
a once-and-for-all increase at t - to> 0. Then our analysis has shown that
the real exchange rate will start appreciating (p rises) until the change in e
actually occurs; then p will start to go down until eventually the real
exchange rate returns to its initial level.
Notice that unlike the one-step depreciation experiment considered
before, here/? always stays above p. Furthermore, an anticipated future
change in e sharply contrasts with the case where e suffers a once-and-for-
all change at t = 0 (the "present"), because the latter results in no change
in p (assuming, as usual, that p0 =p).
It is interesting to note in this connection that the Dornbusch-type
model discussed in section 7.1 will exhibit no impact on the real exchange
rate whether or not the change in the rate of devaluation is anticipated.
7.4 Crawling Peg and Controls on Capital Mobility
In this section we briefly examine the significance of a familiar crawling
peg system and of capital mobility controls for eliminating the non-
uniqueness problem that was discovered in section 7.3.246 Guillermo A. Calvo
Let us first consider the case where Et is chosen according to a rule that
sets it as a function of some average of past rates of inflation (this appears
to be the rule followed for a considerable amount of time by several
countries, like Colombia and Brazil, and has apparently, and very re-
cently, been adopted by Argentina). Specifically, we assume,
1
5





(31) kt = 1(Pt-et) = 1pt,
and, hence,
(32) e,= eo + 7A>
where e0 is given by history at t = 0.
Now substituting the expression for e, given by (32) in equations
(27)-(28) we obtain a differential equation system in v and/7, and we are
thus able to check the uniqueness condition as we did in section 7.3.
However, as is readily verifiable, uniqueness is also insured in this case if
fp < 0 at steady state. Thus the crawling peg system does not eliminate the
nonuniqueness problem.
Let us now study the implications of imposing controls on capital
mobility. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the case of total capital
immobility, where the money market equilibrium is given by
(33) Mt-Pt= -kit,
where the right-hand side is the money demand function, M denotes (the
log of) money supply, and k is a positive parameter. Assuming that_both
the money supply and the exchange rate are constant (and equal to M and
E, respectively), we get
p - M
(34) ,, = /,_/> = _L_-P,.
Thus by (9), (10), and (34),
(35a) P, = 8(V,-P,),
f - P —
(35b) vr = 8jvPp/p£L
Applying the procedure of section 7.3, the condition for uniqueness now
becomes
15. More precisely (30) should have P (the left-hand derivative of P) in the integrand,
but this would not affect our implications.247 Staggered Contracts
(36)
which shows that (36) could be satisfied even when^>0, thus implying
that controlling capital mobility may be an effective way to prevent
nonuniqueness. It should be noted, however, that (36) implies that a
devaluation is not contractionary.
In closing, it is worth noting that any policy that makes fp < 0 will tend
to restore uniqueness. In particular, the removal of import quotas will
work toward that end because it will increase the effective substitutability
of domestic for imported goods.
7.5 Flexible Exchange Rate and Capital Mobility
The main purpose of this section is to sketch out the dynamics of the
flexible exchange rates case and show that under perfect capital mobility
the uniqueness condition is similar to that under (pre-) fixed rates.
Again we assume that the money market equilibrium is given by (33).
Thus, recalling (11), we have
(37) E.-lp,-*,
where a tilde indicates that Mt is subtracted from the corresponding
variable (e.g., P, = Pt — Mt), and we assume Mt — (x, a constant (i.e.,
money supply grows at a constant rate |x). Contrary to the previous
sections, now the exchange rate is market determined under the condi-
tion that the central bank does not accumulate or reduce reserves.
On the other hand, by (9), (10), (11), and (12), we have
(38a) Pt ••
(38b) ?t =
Therefore, at steady state,
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Consider first the case fp>0, which implies nonuniqueness in the fixed
rates case. By (40) and (41) we have either (a) two roots are negative and
one is positive, or (b) the three roots are positive.
1
7 However, since in
system (37)-(38) only Pt is a predetermined variable, uniqueness re-
quires only one root be negative; in case (a) there is a continuum of
converging equilibria, while in case (b) there is none.
Let us now study the situation where ^<0.
1
8 Again, by (40) and (41),
there are two possibilities: either (a') one root is negative and the other
two have nonpositive real parts, or (b') one root is negative and the other
two are positive. We will show now that (a') can never happen, thus
proving that, similarly to the (pre-) fixed rates case, the uniqueness
condition is fp<0 at steady state. We prove it in the following way: If
fp<0, then, by (42),
which contradicts case (a') if all the roots are real numbers. Alterna-
tively, suppose now that Xj is a real number and
(44) M
<0>
X3 = a — bi
(where i_ is the imaginary unit). Then
XjX2 + X^ + X2X3 = \x(a + bi) + Xt(a — bi)
+ (a + bi) (a - bi)
contradicting (43). This proves that (a') cannot hold.
Let us now assume that there exists a unique converging solution (i.e.,
16. These relationships between roots and functions of A2 are well known (see Gant-
macher 1959).
17. We say that a root is negative (positive) according to whether its real part is negative
(positive).
18. As before, we will abstract from the case f = 0.249 Staggered Contracts
fp<0 at steady state). As is well known (see Coddington and Levinson
1955, chap. 4), the qualitative features of the solution of system (35)-
(37) in a "sufficiently" small neighborhood of the steady state can be
ascertained on the basis of its linear approximation. Let \x be the nega-
tive root (a real number, of course), and let x be its associated characteris-
tic vector, that is,
(45)
Therefore, converging solutions of the linear system satisfy
(46) (P, -P,9t- P, Et-E) =
 Ht
where, as usual, a bar indicates steady-state levels, and r\ is a constant
that makes the left-hand side equal to the right-hand side of (46) at t = 0.
An implication of (46) is that all variables converge in a mono tonic
fashion.
Consider now the effect of a once-and-for-all increase in money supply
at t = 0. Clearly, starting at steady state, it makes
(47) PQ<P




But since Et is monotonic, we get
(49) E<0 for all t.
In equilibrium, variable E (as all the others) has toreturn to its steady-
state level. Hence, by (49), Eo will jump above E; after that, E will
monotonically return to E. Interestingly enough, the overshooting and
eventual monotonic return to E are implications that coincide with those
in Dornbusch (1976) based on the model discussed in section 7.1.
Finally, let us consider the impact of a once-and-for-all increase in the
rate of expansion of money supply (i.e., an increase in (x). First, we see
from (37) that,
(50) d£/d|x = <dP/d|i = A:>0.
Since, as indicated above, equilibrium paths are monotonic, and (having
started at steady state)
(51) £0<0
(recall [37] and that dP0/d\x = 0), we are able to conclude, as in the
previous experiment, that E, will be monotonically decreasing over time;
thus, by (50), for the path to converge to steady state we have250 Guillermo A. Calvo
(52) d£/a>
implying that after a higher |x is announced at t = 0, EQ will overshoot its
new, and higher, steady-state level, after which E, will monotonically
return to its new E. Furthermore, monotonicity of equilibrium paths plus
(50) immediately leads us to the conclusion that P, will steadily rise to its
new, and higher, steady-state level.
7.6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper has analyzed a very simple disequilibrium model with
staggered contracts. Its main advantage is that it provides us with a
framework where questions about uniqueness and stability can be ex-
amined for alternative exchange rate systems. Furthermore, despite its
elementary nature, our model represents a level of greater complexity
and richness than those of standard models.
We will not repeat here all the results associated with specific regimes.
Instead, we will concentrate on the issues of uniqueness and stability with
particular reference to the contractionary devaluation literature.
As pointed out in section 7.1, our interest in the issues studied in this
paper stemmed from the observation that if devaluations are contraction-
ary, then a simple-minded, but not implausible, adjustment mechanism
(like [3]) would lead one to conclude that the system is unstable.
Although there is no sacred law by which a system could not be unstable
(Samuelson's "correspondence principle" notwithstanding), instability is
not an implication that should easily be accepted because it may simply be
reflecting a flaw in the model's structure. This is so, in particular, because
as the economy travels along an unstable path, people will eventually
become conscious that reality departs more and more from long-run
equilibrium, and hence the very nature of the adjustment mechanisms
may change, possibly reverting the instability implications.
The model studied in this paper goes a long way to cover itself against
the above-mentioned difficulty. In the first place, we assume perfect
foresight, thus not simply under unusual circumstances, but always is the
public aware of the structure of the economy. Second, slow price ad-
justment is not merely postulated but derived from a price-setting tech-
nology. True, the latter is not as yet fully based on conventional mi-
croeconomic principles, but it should be recalled that our existence and
uniqueness results are independent of the average contract length (i.e.,
independent of 8). Thus for our analysis to be relevant, we only need to
essentially assert that there are nominal contracts lasting (on average) a
nonnegligible amount of time.251 Staggered Contracts
In connection with the contractionary devaluation case, our model
revealed that there will be a "continuum" of converging equilibria if
capital mobility is perfect. This was shown to be so independently of
whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. One possible outcome of
such an "embarrassment of riches" is "confusion" on the part of rational
individuals, given that their predictions will not only have to depend on
the structure of the model but on what they think the others think, the
others think, etc. Moreover, even when the private sector finds a rational
way to resolve which one of the multiple solutions to choose, we as
economists would be at a loss trying to make our predictions on the basis
of the model, unless, of course, there was a systematic way to identify the
chosen solution. Since there is as yet no generally accepted theory to
recover uniqueness in situations where the model does not provide it,
1
9
we think that nonuniqueness situations should in principle be linked to
potential confusion for the private sector, and assured disconcert for
economists.
A major policy implication of this inquiry is that uniqueness will tend to
be restored the stronger the expenditure-switching effects of a devalua-
tion, and the tighter the controls on capital mobility. In particular, the
former could be enhanced by the elimination of quantitative trade bar-
riers (quotas).
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Comment John B. Taylor
An important methodological innovation of Guillermo Calvo's paper is
his continuous time formulation of the staggered contracts model. I found
the analysis fascinating. The approach should have many applications,
not only in the open economy setting emphasized by Calvo, but also in
closed economy models. In this respect the general, staggered contracts
approach—focusing not so much on contracts per se but on unsynchro-
nized wage or price setting—has a number of advantages as a technique
John B. Taylor is a professor in the Department of Economics at Harvard University and
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for modeling slow adjustment of prices, and these come out in Calvo's
continuous time treatment. Among these I would emphasize that (1)
there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment; (2)
there is a short-run trade-off even if policy is fully anticipated, so that an
announced monetary deceleration can have real effects; and (3) anticipa-
tions of the future matter for wage behavior since firms and workers look
ahead when setting prices and wages. Calvo's continuous time treatment
permits a convenient analytic development of these properties of wage
and price dynamics. In discussing the paper, I will concentrate on the
specifications of the price and contract equations as well as the non-
uniqueness property—a result emphasized in Calvo's discussion.
Some of the analytic convenience that Calvo obtains comes from the
exponential distribution assumption used in the price equation: the num-
ber of periods a set price will last before termination is random and
exponentially distributed. While allowing for random contract length is in
principle an improvement over the existing literature, I have several
reservations about the stochastic assumptions in this model.
Casual observation suggests that many contracts in the real world are
not of uniform length; for example, recent wage concessions in the
United States have lead to termination of union contracts before the
customary three-year contract period is completed. Clearly it would be an
improvement over many existing contract models to allow for variable
contract length so that such behavior can be studied. But to model
phenomena like union concessions, it is necessary to capture the eco-
nomic rationale for the early termination by making the contract period
endogenous, or depending on endogenous variables. By making contract
length random, it might appear that Calvo's approach can capture such
phenomena. However, because the randomness is exogenous in the
Calvo model, contract length is no more responsive to endogenous events
than in the fixed-length contract models. Early termination of contracts
arising for endogenous reasons is ruled out by the assumption that the
randomness is exogenous.
When we consider the microeconomic problem of a firm or a worker
setting wages or prices, this exogenous randomness raises further ques-
tions. One of the rationales that has been given for implicit contracts is
the ongoing relationship between a worker and a firm, or a firm and its
customers. For example, it is a convenience for a customer to know with
near certainty the price charged by a firm for its product. Similarly,
risk-averse workers prefer a stable wage. Part of the implicit contract is a
(limited) guarantee that the price or wage will be relatively stable. In this
sense, adding pure randomness to the length of the contract seems
counter to the rationale for the implicit contract. If there were to be early
termination of a contract, one would expect this to be the result of the
occurrence of an endogenous contingency rather than to some purely
random factor.254 Guillermo A. Calvo
Fortunately, I feel that there is another way to interpret the equations
arising from this randomness in Calvo's equations. Rather than each
individual contract having a random length, there could be a distribution
of contracts by length across firms due to heterogeneity of markets or
products. Some contracts could be short while others could be long, even
though no contract would necessarily be random. If over the economy as
a whole there is a stable distribution of firms by contract length, then the
Calvo methods would give the same results but with a different inter-
pretation.
However, if this interpretation is made, then Calvo's exponential
assumption might not be realistic. In some empirical work I have done to
estimate distributions of contracts by length, I found that the distribution
is humped-shaped rather than exponential. For example, there are more
one-year wage contracts than one-quarter contracts. Hence, from an
empirical perspective it would be interesting to consider an extension of
the Calvo model to allow for more general distribution. Unfortunately,
this would likely be at the cost of some of the analytic simplicity which
makes Calvo's approach so attractive.
From an open economy perspective, another potential difficulty with
the Calvo price-setting formulation is that the aggregate price index in the
economy is based solely on domestic firm's pricing decisions. This is seen
most clearly in Calvo's equation (7). In an open economy, the aggregate
price index would be influenced by foreign price decisions and exchange
rate movements either through the channel of imported intermediate
inputs to production, or through escalation clauses. The omission of such
influences from the aggregate price equation could be misleading if one
were interested in how alternative exchange rate policies influence
domestic inflation and unemployment trade-offs.
1 Another interesting
extension of Calvo's model would be to consider such influences on price
by making the aggregate price in equation (7) a weighted average of
domestic firms' prices and a foreign price index converted into domestic
currency units using the exchange rate.
As currently formulated, Calvo's model potentially has a continuum of
solutions arising from the self-fulfilling properties of rational expecta-
tions. Calvo shows that this nonuniqueness can arise if the parameters of
the model are such that a devaluation causes a decline in aggregate
demand. It should be pointed out, however, that this nonuniqueness does
not arise because of the existence of contracts in the model. The replace-
ment of Calvo's contract equations with perfectly flexible prices would
1. This is illustrated in a small, open economy setting by R. Dornbusch, "PPP Exchange
Rate Rules and Macroeconomic Stability," Journal of Political Economy (1982) 90, no. 1,
pp. 158-65, and in a multicountry setting by J. B. Taylor, "Macroeconomic Tradeoffs in an
International Economy with Rational Expectations." in Advances in Quantitative Eco-
nomics, ed. W. Hildenbrand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).255 Staggered Contracts
still result in nonuniqueness for similar parameter values. In fact, the
reason for the nonuniqueness is best understood in a flexible price version
of the model. Substituting the real interest rate (r = i- P) and the
"interest rate parity" condition (i = E) into the aggregate excess demand
for goods, f(P - E, r), results in the aggregate demand equation, /(/?,
—p), where p — P — E. If a devaluation causes a decline in aggregate
demand, then fp>0. Solving the implicit function / for p results in
p = g(p), where g' < 0 iff fp > 0. As is now well known in rational expecta-
tions modeling, nonuniqueness occurs in a simple first-order differential
equation system if any initial "price"/? leads to convergence. Clearly this
is the situation if g' <0, and it arises whether or not contracts are in the
system. Whether fp>0 is an econometric issue related to the relative
importance of income and substitution effects. As in other examples of
nonuniqueness in rational expectations models,
2 the conditions for non-
uniqueness arise when the demand or supply curves slope the "wrong
way." In Calvo's open economy model, the aggregate demand curve
must be upward sloping in the relevant price because substitution effects
are dominated by wealth or income effects.
Comment Michael Mussa
Guillermo Calvo has presented us with a paper that is both ingenious in
its formal analysis and interesting in its substantive economic content. I
am especially impressed by Calvo's modeling of the mechanism of price
adjustment in a situation where the prices of individual commodities are
fixed by long-term contracts. The differential equation system (equations
[9] and [10]) that describes the dynamic behavior of the general price
level and the individual commodity price for a newly negotiated contract
is simple and intuitively appealing. As Calvo demonstrates, this model of
price adjustment is easily applied to interesting issues in open-economy
macroeconomics. I believe it will find many other interesting applica-
tions.
My concerns with Calvo's paper arise primarily in connection with his
discussion of, and his emphasis upon, situations in which a devalutaion of
a country's currency is contractionary with respect to aggregate demand.
In Calvo's model of macroeconomic behavior (as distinct from his model
2. In J. B. Taylor, "Conditions for Unique Solutions in Stochastic Macroeconomic
Models with Rational Expectations," Econometrica 45 (September 1977): 1377-85; for
example, it is shown that the IS—LM curves must cross in an unusual way to get nonunique-
ness.
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University of Chicago and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.256 Guillermo A. Calvo
of price adjustment) this situation arises only when a country is at an
"unstable" equilibrium in the Walrasian sense that an increase in the
relative price of that country's output in terms of the output of the rest of
the world (which is the impact effect of devaluation in Calvo's model)
creates an excess supply of that country's output.
My first concern is that operation of an economy in the neighborhood
of such an equilibrium is not the only possible or reasonable explanation
for observing that devaluations are frequently associated with contrac-
tions of national outputs of the devaluing countries. Another possible
explanation for such a relationship is that a devaluation has contraction-
ary effects because it reduces the real value of the domestic money
supply. In Calvo's model, this effect is not present because it is implicitly
assumed that only the prices of domestic goods (which do not respond
immediately to a devaluation) are relevant in determining the real value
of the domestic money supply. However, in a model that allowed import
prices to enter the price index relevant for measuring real money bal-
ances, or that allowed some domestic prices to respond essentially im-
mediately to a devaluation, there would be an immediate contractionary
effect of devaluation from the reduction in the real value of domestic
money balances. In addition, the impact effect of a devaluation in raising
the prices of imported inputs and perhaps in raising the costs of some
domestic inputs (possibly including wage rates that respond to the actual
and anticipated price level effects of a devaluation) would shift the
aggregate supply curve upward and have a contractionary effect on
national output for any given position of the aggregate demand curve.
Further, if a devaluation is combined, as it frequently is, with more
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies designed to remove the basic cause
for the devaluation and the need for further devaluations, then these
more restrictive policies are likely to induce an observed relationship
between devaluations and contractions of the outputs of devaluing coun-
tries.
My second concern is that if there is an equilibrium that is unstable in
the Walrasian sense, it should be bracketed by two equilibria that are
stable in the Walrasian sense, and the issue arises of which is the relevant
equilibrium for comparative static and dynamic analysis. Existence of an
odd number of alternating stable and unstable equilibria is implied by
continuity of the excess demand function f(p, r) with respect to p, for r
equal to the world real interest rate r*, and by the usual boundary
conditions that f(p, r*) must be negative for all sufficiently high values of
p and must be positive for all sufficiently low values of p.
For the case of three equilibria, under the assumptions of Calvo's
model (with a fixed exchange rate), the dynamic system governing the
behavior of the general price level, Pt, and the price for a newly negoti-
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of the state variables Pt and Vt. At the two outer steady-state points,
which correspond to the two Walrasian-stable equilibria where df/dp < 0,
the dynamic system governing P, and Vt has one positive and one negative
characteristic root. There is a unique stable branch of this dynamic
system that converges to each of these steady-state points. This is consist-
ent with the normal saddle-point stability property that one expects in a
rational expectations model that has both a forward-looking dynamic
process and a backward-looking dynamic process. Paths that start outside
the region between these two stable branches eventually diverge at an
explosive rate from these steady-state points. These paths may be ex-
cluded from consideration by assuming that the economically sensible
choice for the initial value of the price of a newly negotiated contract
should not produce such explosively divergent behavior. The paths that
start in the region between the stable branches leading to the two outer
steady state points also do not converge to either of these steady state
points. This is not peculiar in a model in which we should normally expect
saddle-point stability. What is peculiar is that all these paths that start at
points between the two stable branches ultimately converge to the middle
steady-state point, which is the steady-state point that is associated with
the Walrasian-unstable equilibrium.
Calvo refers to this result of a continuum of paths converging to an
equilibrium where df/dp>0 as "an embarrassment of riches." I find it
simply an embarrassment that a whole continuum of paths should con-
verge to this equilibrium which is unstable in the Walrasian sense, while
only a single path converges to each of the equilibria that are stable in the
Walrasian sense. In my view the way to avoid this embarrassment is to
recognize that none of the paths converging to the Walrasian-unstable
equilibrium represents an economically sensible solution for the dynamic
system governing Pt and Vt.
To develop this point, it is important to note that the economic spec-
ification of Calvo's model requires that the solutions for P, and Vt should
have forward-looking components; that is, there should be a part of the
solutions for Pt and Vt that depends on a discounted sum of expected
future economic conditions relevant for determining the behavior of
prices. The need for these forward-looking components arises because Vt
is defined to depend on a weighted average of expected future values of
Ps + p -f(Ps, rs) and because the domestic interest rate depends on the
forward-looking expected inflation rate. In the neighborhood of a Walra-
sian-stable equilibrium, it is easy to construct the forward-looking com-
ponents of the solutions for Pt and V, for the linearized form of the
dynamic system governing these two variables. In these solutions, the
positive characteristic root of the dynamic system at the steady-state
point is used as the discount rate applied to expected future economic
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tions. In the neighborhood of a Walrasian-unstable equilibrium, how-
ever, there is no way to construct solutions for the linearized form of the
dynamic system governing Pt and V, that have forward-looking compo-
nents because both of the characteristic roots of the dynamic system at
such an equilibrium have negative real parts. In the neighborhood of a
Walrasian-unstable equilibrium, it is possible to construct solutions for Pt
and Vt that are wholly backward-looking, but these wholly backward-
looking solutions do not meet the requirements for an economically
sensible solution for Calvo's model. Since the continuum of solutions that
converge to a Walrasian-unstable equilibrium all ultimately come within
a small neighborhood of this equilibrium, it may be concluded that none
of these solutions meets the requirements of economic sensibility.
Unfortunately, this conclusion requires that we sacrifice some of the
more interesting parts of Calvo's paper that deal explicitly with equilibria
where df/dp is positive and focus instead on equilibria that are stable in
the usual Walrasian sense. In my view, this sacrifice is preferable to
accepting the proposition that Calvo's ingeniously constructed and in-
tuitively appealing model of price adjustment leads to the obviously
unsatisfactory conclusion that a Walrasian-unstable equilibrium is "su-
perstable" in the sense that there is a whole continuum of economically
sensible paths of P, and V, that converge to such an equilibrium and that
there is literally no escape from the neighborhood of such an equilibrium.
Moreover, even without the discussion of the case where df/dp is posi-
tive, a great deal that is of interest and value remains in Calvo's excellent
paper.